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Abstract. We investigate the relationship between computation and
spacetime structure, focussing on the role of closed timelike curves (CTCs)
in promoting computational speedup. We note first that CTC traversal
can be interpreted in two distinct ways, depending on ones understanding
of spacetime. Focussing on one interpretation leads us to develop a toy
universe in which no CTC can be traversed more than once, whence no
computational speedup is possible. Focussing on the second (and more
standard) interpretation leads to the surprising conclusion that CTCs
act as perfect information repositories: just as black holes have entropy,
so do CTCs. If we also assume that P 6= NP, we find that all observers
agree that, even if unbounded time travel existed in their youth, this ca-
pability eventually vanishes as they grow older. Thus the computational
assumption P 6= NP is also an assumption concerning cosmological struc-
ture.
1 Introduction
In the presence of spacetime curvature, the run-time of a program typically
depends on who does the observing; the time registered by a clock co-moving
with a computational system may differ from that registered by an observer
watching the system from elsewhere. The existence of such discrepancies lies at
the heart of relativistic hypercomputation schemes using e.g. Malament-Hogarth
spacetimes [Hog04], slow Kerr black holes [O’N95,EN02] and closed timelike
curves [ANS11]. These schemes indicate that cosmological anomalies allow the
resolution of formally undecidable problems, so it seems not unlikely that they
would also allow problems in NP\P (if any) to be solved in polynomial time. We
investigate in this paper whether this is necessarily the case.
Suppose, then, that we live in a universe which contains closed timelike curves
(CTCs). An observer who traverses a CTC considers himself to be doing nothing
out of the ordinary; he travels forward in time as usual, never exceeding light-
speed, but eventually finds himself at a point in spacetime he has already visited
previously. In a sense, then, the observer has “travelled into the past”, but it is
important to note that at no time does he violate any physical laws as viewed
from his own co-moving frame of reference, nor does he consider himself to be
moving “backwards in time”. He is simply following a path through spacetime
that happens to include a loop.
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Given the capability of time travel, a simple argument then suggests that P
= NP. For suppose A is a deterministic program for solving some problem in
NP, and construct the algorithm A′ in Fig. 1.
0 output v
1 start A and let it run to completion
2 let v be the result generated by A
3 send v back to time 0
Fig. 1. Algorithm A′ exploits time travel to solve in constant time the same problem
that A solves in super-polynomial time.
Although A′ may run for some considerable time, the observer always obtains
the required output at step 0. The total runtime of A′ may be superpolynomial,
since it includes step 1 (running A) but nonetheless the result is produced at
step 0, and in this sense A′ can be said to solve the problem in a fixed amount
of time. Since A′ is deterministic and solves in constant time the same problem
as A, that problem must be in P, whence (loosely speaking) P = NP.
Unfortunately, this apparently simple argument is logically incomplete, since
it relies on unstated assumptions concerning the nature of CTCs, and these
assumptions need not be generally valid. There are two essentially distinct ways
in which CTCs might be exploited to implement computational speed-up. In the
absence (so far) of experimental data confirming the existence of CTCs and the
experiences of observers traversing them, the viability of these two computational
schemes depends upon ones philosophical interpretation of relativity theory. In
this paper we focus on one of these approaches; nonetheless we briefly discuss
the consequences of choosing the other interpretation in Sec. 3.
2 CTC Computation
Consider the following science-fiction cliche´: a historian wants to make a clan-
destine visit to Ancient Rome, so he selects a suitable CTC and sets off on his
journey. He makes detailed notes of Julius Cæsar’s activities, and then returns to
exactly the point in time and space from which he originally set off, so that his
unauthorised absence cannot be detected. He repeats the same deception several
days running. Using the information in his notes, he then writes an important
academic paper and becomes famous.
Although this kind of story is familiar from science fiction, it requires a
particular interpretation of what it means for a body to move in space and time.
For consider what happens when the historian ‘returns to the present’. At this
point in the journey, he occupies exactly the same position in time and space
as when he originally set off on his journey – but he is not constrained to repeat
the same behaviour, for rather than repeating the journey to Ancient Rome, he
chooses instead to write an academic paper. Moreover, since he occupies the
same spacetime position at both points on his journey, and his notepad is in his
pocket both times, its contents should be the same both times – but it contains
notes when he returns which were not present when he set off.
At first sight this seems to suggest a fundamental logical inconsistency, lead-
ing to the conclusion that this kind of CTC exploitation is impossible. But there
is in fact no contradiction present, provided we think of spacetime as a surface
across which bodies move. The fact that a body can occupy a given position
more than once, and be in different states each time, is hardly surprising given
this interpretation; it is no different to a racing driver completing several laps
of a Grand Prix, and then deciding on the next lap that he needs to take a pit
stop so that his tyres can be replaced. He may pass through the same positions
on the track several times, but he is not thereby constrained to repeat the same
behaviour each time.
From the historian’s point of view too there is no contradiction, because we
have to ask ourselves in what sense has he travelled back in time? Certainly, he
cannot have done so relative to his own clock, because he considers himself to
be moving always forwards in time at sublight speeds. His judgment I am in
Ancient Rome must therefore have been made relative to evidence provided by
some independent witness (for example, he could ask a local trader what year it
is, and whether the person standing in front of them is indeed Julius Cæsar). It
is entirely possible, of course, that the witness might observe multiple copies of
the historian, but this is not contradictory either, for each copy is in a different
state (when asked how old he is, each copy of the historian will give a different
answer). From the viewpoint of the witness, the various copies of the historian
are distinct objects, and there is no sense in which the historian is observed in
different places at the same time.
Thus, neither the witness nor the historian observes anything contradictory
as a result of his re-occupying a point in spacetime without being constrained
to repeat the same behaviour. By the same argument, a computer can be sent
around a CTC several times without its computation being forced to loop, so we
could run a program for as long as we like simply by traversing a 5-second CTC as
often as we like. If we arrange for the machine to produce some observable output
if it halts (e.g. by printing a result) we can always decide after 5 seconds whether
the program has halted, and if so what its result is, simply by checking the printer
(which need not be on the CTC). Thus, not only does hypercomputation seem
to be possible in this senario, but all problems in NP can apparently be solved
deterministically in constant time, whence P = NP.
This argument is, however, logically flawed, for although a CTC returns an
observer to an earlier point on his worldline, it does not follow that he can traverse
the CTC a second time, as we now show.
2.1 Single-traversible CTCs
In this section we introduce a crossed-ribbon toy spacetime that includes a single
inhabited CTC. It is impossible for any massive body in this model to traverse
more than one CTC, and no CTC can ever be traversed more than once. Our
crossed-ribbon universe is in some respects non-standard (but we will nonetheless
argue that it is a reasonable model).
Our description of the crossed-ribbon universe is in three stages. First we
construct a standard (1 + 1)-dimensional spacetime (M); then we describe the
crossed-ribbon (Ribbon); and then we populate Ribbon with bodies and consider
their worldlines. Finally, we argue that M can be populated with bodies in such
a way that observations in M and Ribbon are indistinguishable. Since M gives
an inherently acceptable description of spacetime, it follows that Ribbon is also
an observationally reasonable model.
Construction of M . Following Andre´ka and her colleagues [Sze´09,AMN07]
we assume that spacetime is coordinatized by an ordered Euclidean field Q. Our
starting point is a ribbon-shaped manifold, M = (−α, α)×Q, where α ∈ Q (Fig.
2). We regard this as a (1+1)-dimensional Minkowskian spacetime of infinite
length and width 2α, with time flowing along the length of the ribbon, and
space across its width. If we take Q = R, then α should be finite, but for more
general coordinatizations this need not be the case: for example, if Q contains
infinitesimals, α could be an infinite value in Q.
Construction ofRibbon. We now imagine wrappingM around in 3-dimensional
space so that it self-intersects at right-angles. We identify the overlapping re-
gions, and call the resulting manifold Ribbon (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. The (1 + 1)-dimensional manifold M , and the immersed manifold Ribbon gen-
erated by looping M in such a way that it self-intersects at right-angles.
Worldlines in Ribbon. The manifold M is a standard (1 + 1)-dimensional
spacetime model, and we can populate it with bodies in the usual way. As usual,
we shall assume for convenience that time flows up the page, and define as an al-
lowable worldline any path followed by a body that always travels at subluminal
speed. Given any such worldline w in M , we define w′ to be its image in Ribbon.
We then reflect the worldline back into M . In other words, we determine what
other bodies would need to be present in M , and following what worldlines, if
a body following w is to observe exactly the same series of events as a body
moving along the corresponding path w′ in Ribbon (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Schematic showing how a worldline w′ in Ribbon corresponds to three inter-
secting worldlines in M .
2.2 Is Ribbon a reasonable model of spacetime?
Clearly, any body following w′ will encounter itself twice (once each time it
crosses the self-intersection region), but it is important to realise that on each
occasion the body considers its other incarnation to be travelling faster than
light (FTL), because of the way Ribbon intersects itself at right angles (which
ensures that the time and space axes have been interchanged when the body
encounters its past self). Reflecting this back into the original manifold M , the
body traversing w meets two FTL versions of itself as it moves along its worldline.
The paths followed by these FTL bodies are fully determined once w is specified.
Apart from the existence of bodies apparently moving at FTL speeds relative
to one another, there is nothing unusual about this three-body version of M ,
and indeed FTL motion has long been a research topic in cosmological theory
[MTY88,GD00,Sch10]. We therefore claim that populating M with these addi-
tional FTL bodies yields an entirely reasonable (toy) universe. By construction,
however, the flow of events observed by the body following w′ in Ribbon is iden-
tical to the flow observed by the body following w in the three-body variant of
M , whence Ribbon must also be a reasonable (toy) universe.
2.3 Existence of single-traversable CTCs
The significance of Ribbon lies in the nature of the path w′. Since this path
includes a self-intersection, it implements a CTC. But as we have noted above,
when the body meets its former self, its time and space axes have been inter-
changed, and it considers its past self to be travelling at FTL speeds. In order to
re-traverse the CTC it would need to complete the ‘90 degree turn’ at the point
of intersection, and this would violate our presupposition that a body following
a CTC always considers itself to be obeying physical laws and travelling slower
than light.
Thus Ribbon provides an example of a toy spacetime containing just one
inhabited CTC (since Ribbon only contains one body), where this CTC cannot
be traversed a second time.1 As explained above, this undermines the argument
that the existence of CTCs is sufficient, in itself, to ensure the existence of
computational speed-up and hypercomputation. If we wish to deduce that CTCs
move all problems (if any) in NP\P into P, we need to impose the additional
condition that at least one CTC is multiply-traversable.
3 Discussion
We have described an interpretation of CTC traversal in which spacetime exists
as an independent entity across which bodies move subject to various laws;
a body could potentially pass through a given location several times without
being constrained to display identical behaviour subsequently. An alternative
viewpoint is that a point in spacetime is fully defined by the set of bodies that
exist there [AMNS11]. According to this viewpoint, when the historian returns
to the present, he has no choice but to re-traverse the CTC back to Ancient
Rome. Since he occupies the same location in spacetime as his past self, he is
his past self and must behave accordingly. Similarly, since his notes are colocated
with his notepad when he returns from Rome, they must also have been present
before he set off.
3.1 The Entropy of a CTC
This second interpretation severely challenges certain key assumptions of every-
day computer science. For simplity let us assume that one program statement
can be executed every second, and that it takes precisely n seconds to traverse
some given CTC exactly once. If we run a program on a computer following
1 We could, of course, add more bodies to the model if we wished, but doing so would
add nothing to our argument.
this CTC, then once the nth statement has been executed, the entire system will
have returned to its original spacetime location, and so must have returned to
its original state. It follows that no irreversible process can be implemented on
a computer following a CTC. And yet there is no obvious reason we shouldn’t
be able to load our computer with any program we like.
To avoid the apparent contradictions inherent in this situation, we need to
re-appraise the nature of CTC computation. Since reversibility requires that no
information is lost from the system, we have to conclude that when an irreversible
procedure is executed on the computer, the information lost during program
execution must be preserved somehow in the computer’s environment, i.e. the
CTC itself. It is well-known that black holes have an associated entropy [Bek73].
What we are suggesting here is that, given this second interpretation of CTC
traversal, a CTC can also have an associated entropy; indeed CTCs are perfect
information repositories in the sense that information cannot be lost (since it
must be available to re-initialise the computation). It can be argued therefore
that the CTC is an active component in the system which overrides the intended
behaviour of the program, since the computer is forced to return to its initial
state regardless of its underlying specification. Indeed, this can be seen as a
mechanism enforcing the Novikov self-consistency principle [FMN+90] in the
context of CTC computation.2
3.2 Single-traversable CTCs and computational speed-up
Given our original interpretation of CTC traversal, Ribbon shows that CTCs
need not be traversable more than once. This second interpretation of CTC
traversal likewise concludes that repeated traversal of a CTC cannot lead to
computational speed-up, because any lengthy computation would be forced to
return to its initialisation state rather than running to completion. The question
remains whether it is possible to use CTCs to speed up computation, where
we voluntarily restrict ourselves to traversing CTCs no more than once. Indeed
such schemes are described in the literature [Bru03], but these schemes make
the additional assumption of causal consistency, using it to deduce that CTC-
computation can solve PSPACE-problems [AW09].
As with CTCs themselves, there is no convincing evidence that causal con-
sistency is experimentally necessary. What, then, can we deduce if we impose
no additional constraints, and simply regard CTCs to be used as an implemen-
tation of time travel. As we illustrated in Fig. 1, the availability of time travel
can be used to show that P = NP. But the situation is not entirely clearcut,
because we have assumed in Fig. 1 that information can be sent back to time 0
no matter how long we have to wait for A to complete its execution. But there is
no guarantee that this is the case. For example, suppose the maximum time any
2 Alternatively, one can argue that the information capacity of a CTC is strictly
limited; this ensures that the computer cannot be provided with arbitrarily complex
programs, and those programs cannot be supplied with arbitrarily complex inputs.
Our research into this question is ongoing.
CTC can take a traveller back is 5 seconds; then as soon as an input is provided
which causes A to run for more than 5 seconds, algorithm A′ will be invalid.
This suggests that, even in the presence of time travel, we cannot necessar-
ily reduce problems in NP\P (if any) to problems in P. For the remainder of
this paper we therefore assume, to the contrary, that P 6= NP and ask what
consequences this assumption entails.
CTCs and P 6= NP. We assume the existence of some arbitrary observer
(typically a computer) O. Given any spacetime location X on O’s worldline,
write X+ for the set of timelike paths starting at X that are traversable (in
theory) by observers co-moving with O at X. From O’s viewpoint, these paths
are all future-pointing, and it is possible forO to send information (e.g. by rocket)
along any of these paths without requiring lightspeed or faster-than-light travel.
Some of these paths may intersect O’s worldline at points other than X.
If these points lie to the past of X from O’s point of view, then CTCs are
present, and we can ask to what extent they can be exploited computationally.
For simplicity, we will assume that O can identify whether any given path in X+
leads to a point Y in his past, and can also identify the point Y itself (i.e., how
far back into his past the path takes him). It is extremely unlikely, of course,
that such properties of CTCs would ever be so conveniently decidable.
Write Past(X) for the set of all such points Y , i.e. those points on O’s past
worldline that he can revisit by following paths in X+. For each such intersection
Y , write |X − Y | for the amount of time that originally passed, from O’s point
of view, in travelling from Y to X. In other words, if O chooses to follow the
path in question, how far into his own past will it take him? For simplicity we
shall assume that all durations are measured in seconds.
Given any time t, write X(t) for the point X on O’s worldline that has
time coordinate t as coordinatized by O, and define the set of time differences
available at time t to be the set
D(t) = {|X(t)− Y | : Y ∈ Past(X(t))}
and let
D∗(t) =
{
supD(t) if D(t) is bounded above
undefined otherwise .
In essence, the function D∗(t) tells us how far back O can travel into his own
past if he sets off on his journey at time t. If D∗(t) is undefined, there is no limit
to how far back O can travel. Likewise we write R(t) for the set of past times O
on his own worldline that are reachable by setting off from X(t), and R∗(t) for
the infimum of these reachable times, i.e.
R(t) = {t− t′ : t′ ∈ D(t)}
and
R∗(t) =
{
inf R(t) if R(t) is bounded below
undefined otherwise .
We show that when P 6= NP, R∗(t) (equivalently, D∗(t)) must be defined for
all sufficiently large t.
Lemma 1. If t′ ≤ t, then R(t) ⊆ R(t′).
Proof. Any path in X(t)+ can be prepended by the section of O’s worldline
running between times t′ and t to generate a path in X(t′)+. uunionsq
Theorem 1. Suppose P 6= NP. Then, for all sufficiently large t, R(t) is bounded
below, and hence R∗(t) is defined.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an unbounded increasing se-
quence of times t at which R(t) has no lower bound. By Lemma 1, R(t) must be
unbounded below for all t.
Let A be a deterministic algorithm for solving some problem in NP. We use A
to define a new algorithm B to be implemented on a computer co-moving with
O, with the following behaviour (essentially a generalisation of the algorithm
presented in Sect. 1).
Given n, O resets his clock to 0, waits one second and then checks whether
any output has yet been generated. One second later he starts running A(n).
After A(n) has eventually halted at time t (say), B travels back to some T < 0
in R(t), waits until he re-encounters time 0, and then publishes the result in
time for his earlier incarnation to observe it at time 1. As before this implies
that problems in NP can be solved deterministically in constant time, whence P
= NP (contrary to assumption).
Therefore no unbounded increasing sequence of times t exists at which R(t)
is unbounded below, and the result follows. uunionsq
Corollary 1. Suppose R∗(t) is defined, and suppose t′ ∈ (R∗(t), t]. Then R∗(t′)
is also defined, and R∗(t) = R∗(t′).
Proof. By assumption, t′ > R∗(t), so since R∗(t) = inf R(t) there must exist
T ∈ R(t) satisfying t′ > T ≥ R∗(t). Consequently, O can travel back from X(t)
to arrive back on his past worldline at time T , then wait (if necessary) until
time t′ before setting off on any path in R(t′). Thus any past time reachable
by O from X(t′) is also reachable from X(t), whence R(t′) ⊆ R(t). Since R(t)
is bounded below, the same must be true of R(t′), whence R∗(t′) is defined, as
claimed.
Lemma 1 tells us conversely that R(t) ⊆ R(t′) (since t′ ≤ t), and combining
the two inclusions gives R(t) = R(t′), whence the claim follows. uunionsq
What do these simple results tell us? Theorem 1 tells us that, even if an
observer is able to travel arbitrarily far back in time when he is young, he
will eventually lose that capability as he grows older, and his reach into the
past will become finite. Corollary 1 then tells us as he grows older, he loses
access to more and more of his past. This computational assumption seems to
be telling us something also about cosmological structure. The exact nature of
the relationship depends on an analysis of how fast the function R∗ grows, and
remains an open question.
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